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Abstract/Résumé: 
Following the Brexit vote in 2016, the British government stated that it hoped 
to reach a new trade agreement with Canada rapidly, to be modeled after the Canada-
E.U. “Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement” (CETA). This agreement was 
the first Canadian free trade deal for which Canadian provinces were directly involved 
at every stage of negotiations. In the UK, whilst there are mechanisms for the 
involvement of devolved regions in European policy, there is no clear constitutional 
principle or doctrine as to the roles they should play in elaborating trade policy more 
generally. Moreover, the asymmetric nature of the UK’s devolution system, as to 
compared to Canada’s mostly symmetric federal system, complicates the involvement 
of the devolved governments in trade negotiations. By providing a specific focus on the 
cases of Quebec and Scotland, the two countries’ most active and most autonomous 
substate units on the international scene, this article provides a comprehensive 
comparison of the two systems across the sectors of trade negotiation and trade 
promotion. It concludes that whilst there seems to be only limited scope for formal input 
into future trade negotiations led by both Canada and the UK as a whole, trade and 
investment promotion organizations in each substate jurisdiction provide one effective 
avenue through which different objectives over trade outcomes could be achieved 
within a unified national framework.  
Après le vote sur le Brexit en 2016, le gouvernement britannique a déclaré qu'il 
espérait conclure rapidement un nouvel accord commercial avec le Canada, sur le 
modèle de l’Accord économique et commercial global (AECG) entre le Canada et 
l'Union européenne. Cet accord était le premier accord de libre-échange pour lequel les 
provinces canadiennes étaient directement impliquées à chaque étape des négociations. 
Au Royaume-Uni, il n'y a pas de principe constitutionnel ou de doctrine claire quant au 
rôle des régions dévolues dans l'élaboration de la politique commerciale en général 
même s'il existe des mécanismes de participation de ces dernières à la politique 
européenne du Royaume-Uni. En outre, la nature asymétrique du système de 
décentralisation du Royaume-Uni complique la participation des régions dévolues aux 
négociations commerciales. En mettant l'accent sur les cas du Quebec et de l'Écosse, 
les gouvernements subétatiques les plus actifs et les plus autonomes des deux pays sur 
la scène internationale, cet article propose une comparaison complète des deux 
systèmes dans les domaines de la négociation et de la promotion commerciale. Nous en 
concluons que bien que leurs perspectives d’implication dans de futures négociations 
commerciales soient limitées, les rôles joués par leurs organismes de promotion du 
commerce et de l’investissement leur permettent de viser différents objectifs en matière 
d’activités commerciales au sein de systèmes nationaux unifiés.  
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Introduction 
Having formally left the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK) has 
commenced international trade negotiations and stated that it hoped to reach a new trade 
agreement with Canada rapidly, to be modeled after the Canada-EU “Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement” (CETA). But in the more than forty years since the 
UK last negotiated a trade deal – as opposed to the negotiations having been led by the 
EU on its behalf – its constitutional arrangements have evolved substantially, with 
devolved legislatures being established in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 
1999. The UK’s future trade agreements have implications for these legislatures, not 
least because they will impact upon a whole range of devolved policy responsibilities. 
As a result, all three have made the case that they should have a formal role in the 
development and negotiation of future UK trade agreements. This argument has been 
made particularly forcefully by the Scottish government, which argues that it should 
have a formal role in all stages of negotiations, from the formulation of negotiating 
mandates to treaty ratification. In this context, the role of Canadian provinces in the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiations has frequently 
been cited as a model to which the UK could aspire after Brexit. 
  Canada and the UK share many of the same constitutional principles. Even if 
the federal setting of Canada contrasts with the UK as a unitary state characterised by 
a very asymmetric devolution system, in Canada, like in the UK, trade negotiations and 
ratification are reserved to the central government. In both countries, the second 
chamber of the central government also does not play the role of a representative of the 
substate governments. Moreover, Quebec and Scotland do not have the ability to veto 
a trade negotiation conducted by Britain or Canada. In Canada, the Canadian provinces 
can only refuse to implement the agreement in their areas of jurisdiction. In the UK, the 
devolved institutions have no formal role in co-determining trade policy, and there is 
no requirement for them to even be consulted.  
Nevertheless, the two countries are contrasting cases on the fundamental issue 
of the role of substate governments participation in trade negotiations. In Canada, a 
practice established since the 1980s gives an important role to the Canadian provinces. 
In the CETA negotiations, Canadian provinces have even had access to certain 
negotiating tables. That being said, whilst Canada’s CETA experience has frequently 
been hailed as a paragon of subnational involvement, it is not necessarily typical of the 
roles of Canadian provinces. In contrast, one area of greater similarity between Canada 
and the UK is the role that the devolved and provincial governments play in stimulating 
exports and encouraging inward investment via subnational trade and investment 
promotion organizations (TIPOs). As argued below, these agencies’ knowledge of 
exporters’ and investors’ needs could indeed become of great value in maximising the 
beneficial outcomes of future trade negotiations.  
The aim of this paper, in short, is thus to explore these differences and 
similarities, to find out what works, what hasn’t and what lessons could be applied more 
broadly from the Canadian experience to the UK. We provide a knowledge synthesis 
and comparative analysis of the motivations of Quebec and Scotland to become 
engaged in international trade agreements, and of the factors that determine the extent 
to which the subnational governments can influence the outcomes of such agreements. 
We draw from published materials, government documents, parliamentary statements 
and formal and informal interviews with civil servants from Scotland and Quebec. In 
the case of Canada, semi-structured interviews were conducted throughout the CETA, 
CPTPP and CUSMA negotiations with officials, advisors and experts from Ottawa, 
Quebec and the EU who were directly involved in negotiations. With such a specific 
focus on the cases of Quebec and Scotland, and by adding the angle of trade and 
investment promotion to the more traditional analysis of multilevel governance and 
trade policy, this article provides a comprehensive comparison of the two systems 
across policy sectors.  
The paper contains four main sections. The first is devoted to a literature review 
about substate governments and international trade. The second is about the Canadian 
case and explores the evolving prerogatives of provinces – with a specific focus on 
Quebec – in international trade negotiations and treaty implementation. The third 
section is devoted to the UK case and explores the potential prerogatives of devolved 
administrations – with a specific focus on Scotland – in the elaboration and 
implementation of post-Brexit British trade policy. The last section of the paper is 
devoted to the contributions of subnational TIPOs in Canada and the UK, with the same 
focus on Quebec and Scotland. Our main arguments are that although they have 
historically been overlooked in the conduct of international trade negotiations in 
multilevel settings, subnational trade and investment promotion networks are 
particularly well-developed in both Quebec and Scotland, and would therefore be well-
placed to inform subnational but also national governments and trade negotiators of the 
market gaps and opportunities that future trade agreements should address in priority. 
We therefore conclude that whilst there seems to be only limited scope for formal 
subnational input into future trade negotiations led by Canada or the UK as a whole, 
TIPOs do provide effective avenues through which different objectives over trade 
outcomes can be achieved at the subnational level. 
Literature Review 
International trade negotiations address increasingly sensitive issues for substate 
governments such as government procurement, regulatory cooperation, services, public 
health, diversity of cultural expressions, business subsidies, investor-state dispute 
settlement, removal of non-tariff barriers, agriculture, labour mobility, the environment, 
etc1. In this context, substate governments are aware that their constitutional jurisdiction 
and their ability to formulate and implement policy depends on these trade agreements. 
Increasingly, therefore, some substate governments want to be included in the multi-
level dynamics of trade negotiations2. The lessons from the CETA negotiations also 
confirm that substate governments are important actors in legitimizing trade deals, 
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because when they oppose such agreements, they jeopardize the negotiations and risk 
provoking chain reactions. This was particularly evident in the Walloon case3.  
In the international political economy literature on trade negotiation, a frequent 
opposition to the inclusion of substate governments comes from Fritz Scharpf’s4 
concept of the “joint decision trap.” Transposing this perspective to trade negotiations 
means that substate governments should find it easier to agree on the lowest common 
denominator or to advance their defensive interests, thereby encouraging protectionism. 
Freudlsperger5 argues, however, that the participation of Canadian provinces in the 
negotiation of CETA invalidated this perspective. During these negotiations for 
instance, Canadian provinces proposed the most important concessions in their history 
in the area of public procurement.  
Another important theory states that there is an asymmetry, in the EU context, 
between the means of influence of regional authorities in federated states and the results 
of trade negotiations6. The substate governments that have the most power to influence 
trade negotiations are those of Belgium. Since they participate in the Belgian delegation 
to the European Council, they can influence the European Commission. They can also 
threaten to use their veto and block Belgium’s approval process, as the Walloon Region 
has done with CETA, supported by the Brussels-Capital Region and the French 
Community of Belgium. To resolve the problem of the Walloon blockade, many 
concessions were made by the EU and Canada, such as the inclusion of a joint 
interpretative legal instrument to clarify the interpretation of certain provisions, 
particularly in the areas of labor law, the environment and the investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism7.  
Some regional authorities in Europe can also influence trade negotiations 
through a collective institution such as the Bundesrat in Germany, whose members are 
appointed by Länder governments and can block the ratification of trade agreements. 
Most regional authorities in Europe, however, are rather “transceivers:” their role is 
generally limited to receiving and transmitting politically relevant information to 
national negotiators8. Regional authorities like Scotland, who do not have the 
constitutional powers to veto or mobilize collectively through an institution such as a 
senate can only act as transceivers. Scotland’s means of influence are indeed not very 
important since it has no veto, little access to trade policymakers through 
intergovernmental mechanisms, and cannot block international agreements through the 
House of Lords.   
Canadian provinces do not have the ability to veto a Canadian-led trade 
negotiation either. In Canada, the federal government has plenary power in matters 
relating to international trade. Canadian provinces can only refuse to implement the 
agreement in their areas of jurisdiction. Moreover, the Canadian Senate does not 
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represent the provinces. Still, CETA's experience indicates that while Canadian 
provinces do not have a veto over, they nonetheless had unprecedented influence in the 
negotiations, as they were able to impact the positions of Canada from within. This 
influence has been even greater than that of Wallonia9. Quebec, for example, submitted 
more than 150 policy position papers and participated in more than 275 meetings with 
federal, provincial and territorial negotiators. Overall, Quebec’s influence has been felt 
on many issues such as regulatory cooperation, certification, labour mobility and 
diversity of cultural expressions10. Moreover, the provinces largely accepted the 
outcome of the negotiations because they were part of it. Simply put, transceivers like 
the Canadian provinces can thus have, paradoxically, more influence than regions with 
constitutional powers over international trade. 
According to Tatham11, substate governments have various channels of 
influence in trade negotiations. These channels can be intra-state and extra-state. It is 
to a very large extent the constitutional powers of substate governments that influence 
their strategies. In Europe, regions like Wallonia or Bavaria can use extra-state channels 
to engage with European institutions, notably through the Committee of the Regions. 
In the EU context, extra-state channels tend to be mobilised more frequently than intra-
state ones. The opposite holds true in the North American context, since the federated 
states of the three North American federations - Canada, Mexico and the United States 
- have no supranational institutions to lobby.  
What is missing from Tatham’s analysis, however, is that Canadian provinces 
can also seek to influence European institutions. Canadian provinces, such as Quebec, 
can make representations to European institutions and trade policy actors. For example, 
Quebec's Delegate General in Brussels, Christos Sirros, met with Peter Mandelson, the 
European Commissioner for Trade, to explore the idea of relaunching trade negotiations 
with Canada. Quebec’s Premier Jean Charest also convinced France’s Nicolas Sarkozy, 
who held the rotating Presidency of the EU Council in 2008, to support the idea of 
relaunching free trade negotiations. Later, according to Paul Magnette12, President 
François Hollande approved of CETA because it was born out of a France-Quebec 
initiative. During the negotiations, the Quebec government's chief negotiator for CETA, 
Pierre-Marc Johnson, also had numerous bilateral face-to-face meetings with the EU’s 
chief negotiator, Mauro Petriccionne13. 
The influence of Canadian provinces in trade negotiations is therefore wielded 
mainly through intergovernmental mechanisms or intra-state and extra-state channels. 
Canada lacks, however, a comprehensive framework agreement for federal-provincial 
consultations related to international negotiations, and there is very little consistency in 
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approaches. For each negotiation, provinces must “negotiate their role in the 
negotiations” and as we will see, their level of participation in CETA was exceptional14.  
Despite major differences between the Canadian and British systems, besides, 
Canadian provinces and the UK’s devolved regions, with Quebec and Scotland prime 
among them, have been able to erect wide-ranging and similarly structured 
“commercial paradiplomacy” apparatuses, centered around trade-focused networks of 
international offices and TIPOs15. As explained in the final section of this paper, these 
TIPOs and apparatuses have proved very useful in the day-to-day practice of 
international trade and investment, especially when it comes to helping businesses 
navigate the rules of commercial agreements and the intricacies of foreign markets, but 
have so far remained peripheral to the elaboration of trade policies or the conduct of 
trade negotiations themselves. In the wake of Brexit, however, closer coordination 
between subnational governments and TIPOs in Quebec and Scotland illustrated how 
the latter’s firsthand knowledge of markets constitutes significant untapped potential, 
of which commercial policymakers and negotiators in Canada and the UK could 
benefit. 
In developed countries, most TIPOs (foreign investment promotion agencies 
and export promotion organizations) operate either as “in-house” ministerial units or as 
“arms-length” public agencies. On average, such organizations can count on networks 
of around ten to twenty international offices, whereas both Quebec and Scotland 
maintain over thirty. Most subnational TIPOs, moreover, operate independently from 
(although often in concertation with) national diplomatic services, and coordinate much 
more closely with their own government sponsor and/or other regional organizations16. 
TIPOs perform a range of functions, and many are becoming full-fledged economic 
development agencies. The central economic rationale behind their establishment has 
been that of “information asymmetries,” as exporters and foreign investors generally 
have limited knowledge of their target markets, and the costs of acquiring such 
knowledge often appears prohibitive in comparison to the projected benefits17.  
In the case of export promotion organizations, services offered thus range from 
managerial advice to market intelligence, marketing in commercial missions and trade 
fairs (on behalf of individual businesses and/or industrial sectors), networking (helping 
exporters find clients, suppliers and distributors), and the management of financial or 
fiscal aid18. Investment promotion organizations, in turn, engage in “branding” the 
home market as an investment destination, identifying potential investors, “targeting” 
(finding investors likely to complement or complete domestic clusters’ supply-and-
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value-chains), “matching” services (linking foreign investors with potential local 
partners), managing financial/fiscal incentives, and providing “aftercare” services, i.e. 
the accompaniment of investors and “embedding” of foreign subsidiaries in the home 
market19. 
 
The importance of “commercial paradiplomacy” – i.e. the trade and investment 
promotion activities of subnational governments – for the maximization of international 
trade flows has been underlined by a relatively abundant literature20. Most of it has 
focused on either export promotion or investment promotion organizations, although 
the two are increasingly being merged. With few exceptions, this literature 
demonstrated that TIPOs strongly contribute in growing and diversifying trade and 
investment flows, but also in upholding them in economic downturns and crises21. In 
some cases, the opening of a trade and investment promotion office abroad “is almost 
equivalent to signing a free trade agreement with the same country.22” Many analyses 
of regional TIPOs also demonstrated their key importance23, and highlighted the 
necessity of a good match between TIPOs’ services and the business population they 
serve, more likely to be attained at the subnational level. 
 
The work of TIPOs (national, regional, and even local) in providing information 
and business support is therefore likely to become crucial, as uncertainties continue to 
rise in line with protectionism and trade conflicts. TIPOs, indeed, generally serve 
another crucial function: policy advocacy. Coordinating with their government 
sponsors, they provide information and advice on businesses’ or investors’ needs, and 
on policy best practice24. Provincial and regional TIPOs are not only best placed to 
inform exporters and investors of potential market opportunities, but also to inform 
governments of the market gaps and prospects that trade policies should address in 
priority. Both Quebec and Scottish TIPOs, for instance, have been and remain closely 
involved in both the elaboration and implementation of their region’s governmental 
strategies for international trade and investment25, either through regular high-level 
meetings with government officials or contributions to government consultations on 
specific policy initiatives. Notwithstanding, therefore, their respective country’s system 
of intergovernmental relations when it comes to international trade, to which we now 
turn, these organizations can provide, as we argue in our final section, an effective 
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avenue through which different objectives over trade outcomes can be achieved at the 
subnational level.   
 
Federalism, provincial prerogatives, and the Quebec exception in Canadian trade 
negotiations 
In Canada, the Constitution Act, 1867 barely addresses the issue of international 
relations. Unlike some other federations, there is no constitutional assignment of 
exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs. The provisions on the division of legislative 
powers - sections 91 and 92 - do not explicitly specify a federal or provincial authority 
over foreign policy26. This silence is explained by the fact that Canada did not become 
a sovereign country in 1867, but remained a member of the British Empire. Only the 
latter enjoyed the rights of a sovereign entity and there was no need to define the 
prerogatives of the provinces or federal government in this area. The framers of the 
Constitution did not foresee that Canada would eventually enjoy the same autonomy in 
foreign policy as it did in domestic affairs. As a result of the Statute of Westminster of 
1931, Canada was granted full international personality, including the right to enter its 
own treaties. However, there is no indication that the federal government has the 
capacity to implement the treaties it concludes in areas of provincial jurisdiction.  
As a result of the Statute of Westminster, the federal government became more 
proactive in treaty-making and would attempt to impose treaty implementation on the 
provinces. Several disputes were brought before the courts. The Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council in London rendered the most important judgment on the rights of 
provinces in international treaty matters in 1937. In its judgment, the Committee noted 
that while section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867 gave Parliament and the federal 
government the power to implement imperial treaties, it did not confer general 
jurisdiction on the Canadian state to implement treaties. The decision placed great 
emphasis on the reasoning that if the federal government's treaty powers were 
exclusive, this would allow the federal government to implement treaties in areas of 
provincial jurisdiction, in complete contradiction to the division of powers provided for 
in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution. The Judicial Committee thus ruled that the 
power of implementation follows this division of powers27.  
Today, it is generally accepted that only the Canadian government has the power 
to enter into international treaties even though some provinces, such as Quebec, also 
enter into international “agreements.” Canadian provinces have also been increasingly 
involved in trade negotiations since the 1980s28, for two fundamental reasons. First, 
while the federal government is constitutionally responsible for international trade and 
can negotiate in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, it cannot compel the 
provinces to implement ratified trade agreements. The federal executive branch is 
responsible for the negotiation of treaties, signature, and ratification. The legislative 
branch, federal or provincial, is responsible of the implementation. Legislative 
intervention at the appropriate level is therefore necessary to incorporate treaties into 
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domestic law29. If the federal or provincial law is already compatible with the treaty, no 
new legislation is required, but where domestic law is incompatible, implementing 
legislation is required and may take different forms, ranging from an annex to a separate 
statute that more or less reproduces the provisions of the treaty. Second, the “new 
generation” of trade agreements, such as CETA, increasingly concern areas of 
provincial jurisdiction30.  
When a trade treaty affects a province's jurisdiction, provincial procedures vary. 
In most cases, an executive decree in which a province declares itself bound by the 
treaty or an amendment to the regulations is enough. Ontario, for example, does not 
have a formal approval procedure for free trade agreements negotiated by Canada. An 
assessment is made to determine whether legislative, regulatory, or administrative 
changes are required, and the province then implements them. In the case of a treaty 
that affects Quebec's constitutional jurisdiction, the situation is different. Since 2002, 
the National Assembly must approve the treaty before government gives its assent. Any 
“significant” international commitment, which requires the adoption of new legislation, 
the drafting of regulations, the imposition of a tax or the acceptance of a financial 
obligation, or that concerns human rights or international trade, must be approved by 
the National Assembly. It should be noted that this practice does not exist in Ottawa or 
any other Canadian province. Yet, the fact that the National Assembly must approve 
treaties gives it little influence over negotiations. Indeed, the debate and vote in the 
National Assembly take place after the treaty is signed. Members of the National 
Assembly can neither adopt nor reject the agreement. They may, however, refuse to 
implement the treaty within Quebec’s jurisdictions. 
Thus, in practice, while Canada's trade negotiations are operated by the federal 
government even when the subject matter of the negotiation is within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the provinces, provincial governments have been increasingly involved. 
Intergovernmental negotiations take place between senior officials and sometimes 
between ministers. Final decisions also involve first ministers, but there is no overall 
framework agreement for federal-provincial consultations related to international 
negotiations. This situation has created problems in the past, and Canada’s inability to 
ensure that the treaties it negotiates are implemented by the provinces in their areas of 
jurisdiction undermines its credibility in negotiations31. Various strategies have been 
used in the past to avoid such problems. The first is to negotiate an agreement only in 
areas of federal jurisdiction. During the negotiation of the Canada-Colombia Free Trade 
Agreement, the federal government excluded all provincial measures that predated the 
potential agreement in the areas of services and investment32.  
Another strategy is to involve the provinces in the negotiations. To do this, the 
federal government and the provinces can set up intergovernmental mechanisms. Since 
the 1970s and 1980s, a number of such mechanisms have been established, first in the 
context of the GATT negotiations and, beginning with the U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement, for preferential agreements. Today, the most widely used are the “C-Trade 
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meetings,” regularly convened by the federal government33. These meetings involve 
federal, provincial and territorial officials and are designed to discuss Canada's trade 
issues. 
In the case of CETA negotiations, the provinces have been called upon to play 
a much greater role than in any previous international negotiation. Provinces 
participated in the drafting of Canada’s negotiating mandate, were able to give their 
opinions on the issues and subjects of negotiation, obtained greater access to the texts 
during the negotiations, and were consulted or even participated in all rounds of 
negotiations in Ottawa and Brussels. During the negotiations, Quebec produced more 
than 150 policy position papers34. In addition, “more than 275 meetings between federal 
negotiators and their provincial and territorial counterparts, many meetings involving 
provinces and territories with common interests, and bilateral meetings in camera 
between a province or territory and federal negotiators” were held35.  
Around the same time, Canada also entered into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
which later became the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP). Canada's involvement in these negotiations came late. This 
context influenced not only the scoping exercise, but also the drafting of the negotiating 
mandate. Indeed, Canada joined the negotiations from a more defensive perspective to 
ensure that an agreement would not be reached in its absence. This contrasts with the 
offensive role that Canada assumed in CETA. Consequently, the issue of provincial 
participation in the negotiations has not been a condition of the negotiating countries, 
and the CETA model of active provincial participation was not taken up in these 
negotiations36. Provinces were not consulted on policy issues, nor did they have access 
to the negotiating tables, and intergovernmental mechanisms were limited to meetings 
and updates on trade in goods and services during and after the negotiating rounds. In 
addition, during negotiating rounds, negotiating texts were often presented to the 
provinces at the last minute; comments were solicited, but there was often insufficient 
time for analysis. The same approach was used for post-round briefings on the spot and 
at C-Trade meetings.  
The provinces were not invited, either, to the negotiating tables during the 
renegotiation of NAFTA. They received regular updates and shared their views with 
the federal government but did not have access to the negotiations. However, they were 
consulted closely in areas of significant economic interest or shared/specific 
jurisdiction. Frequent consultations between the federal and provincial teams also took 
place in special meetings focused on the renegotiation, rather than in the usual C-Trade 
meetings37. Provinces were also invited to participate in strategy meetings prior to 
negotiating rounds, as well as in monthly debriefing sessions. Representatives from all 
Canadian provinces were present at each round of NAFTA renegotiations, as these were 
important opportunities to meet with federal negotiators, stakeholders from various 
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Deblock, Joel Lebulanger and Stéphane Paquin, eds, Un nouveau pont sur l’Atlantique : l’Accord 
économique et commercial global entre l’Union européenne et le Canada (Quebec : Presses de 
l’Université du Quebec, 2015), 30. 
36 Anonymous interviews in Quebec, October 2017, April 2018 and October 2018; and in Toronto in 
March and October 2018. 
37 Ibid. 
sectors, and representatives from other provinces to work with them on specific issues. 
Throughout the renegotiations, all provinces also had a representative in Washington, 
and had the opportunity to participate in discussions on all issues within their areas of 
jurisdiction. Negotiation texts were circulated and all parties respected confidentiality 
protocols38. 
Table 1: Summary of provincial roles in Canadian trade negotiations 
 CETA CPTPP CUSMA 
Definition of the mandate 
in consultation with 
provinces 
federal only federal only 
Provincial presence at 
the negotiating table 
yes, but with limitations no no 
Mechanisms for federal-
provincial consultation 








Due to the large volume of information required for NAFTA, the C-Trade meetings 
were replaced by separate meetings specifically dedicated to these renegotiations. The 
provinces were not only consulted but were also given the opportunity to provide input. 
Thus, unlike the CPTPP negotiations, where the provinces were not consulted in depth 
because of the rapid pace of the process, federal-provincial engagement in the NAFTA 
renegotiations was broader and more inclusive39. However, the federal level remained 
responsible for final decisions, and all final decisions on sensitive issues were decided 
without provincial input.  
The difference between federal-provincial relations during the CETA process 
on the one hand, and CUSMA and the CPTPP negotiations on the other, can be 
explained by the fact that the EU insisted on the involvement of the provinces in the 
first case, but also by the actual content of the negotiations40. The potential extent of 
provincial involvement in the event of negotiations between Canada and the UK 
therefore remains unclear and would depend on the issues discussed. It would also most 
likely depend on the level of participation granted to substate governments in the United 
Kingdom, to which we now turn. 
Brexit, devolution and the Scottish Government’s prerogatives in UK trade 
negotiations 
Since the UK voted to leave the EU in June 2016, “Brexit” has been the source 
of tensions between the UK and its devolved governments41. One key source of such 




40 Paquin, “Fédéralisme et négociations.” 
41 Nicola McEwen, “Negotiating Brexit: Power Dynamics in British Intergovernmental 
Relations,” Regional Studies, forthcoming. 
negotiation and ratification of trade agreements, is reserved to the UK Government42. 
As pointed out above, the devolved institutions have no formal role in co-determining 
trade policy, and there is no requirement for them to even be consulted. But whilst the 
negotiation of trade agreements is formally “reserved,” the breadth of the devolved 
parliaments’ competencies is such that trade agreements have implications in areas of 
devolved policy competence43. These include direct implications in the case of 
agricultural subsidies, state aid rules and regional development funding, but also, 
indirect ones in areas such as economic development, higher education, or research and 
development.  
Like many aspects of Brexit, the machinery of this is still being developed. But 
we do have an early signal of the approach that the UK Government intends to take 
with the devolved administrations on trade. 
This is perhaps best illustrated in the draft “2020 United Kingdom Internal 
Market Bill”44, which aims to do two things. Firstly, it seeks to reaffirm the position of 
the UK Government in having constitutional responsibility for all international treaties. 
Secondly, it aims to set out how international treaties – including future trade deals - 
should be implemented within the UK devolved policymaking framework. Under EU 
membership, policies of all governments are made within the context of EU law. This 
also ensures that there are no barriers to trade and mobility across the EU. When the 
EU signs a trade deal, the details are required to be adhered to in each and every part of 
the EU, including within the UK. The UK Government’s proposals are designed to 
ensure that this holds true post 1st January 2021. The Market Access Commitment in 
the Bill means that goods, service providers and professional practitioners that meet 
regulatory standards in one part of the UK are entitled to enter the market anywhere in 
the UK, without having to meet local regulations.  
These rules on mutual recognition and non-discrimination will ensure that, in 
effect, any trade deals that the UK Government strikes and implements for England 
must be adhered to in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (even if such a policy does 
not meet local regulations)45.  
The internal market bill is hugely controversial and it remains uncertain whether 
it will be passed into law in its curent form. The Bill was resoundedly defeated in the 
House of Lords in October 2020. The response of the devolved administrations has been 
one of intense anger. Both the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments have refused to give 
legislative consent to the Bill.  
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The underlying issues and principles that lie at the heart of the Bill  - that is, the 
autonomy of the devolved adminstrations to seek to influence or block any UK-wide 
trade agreements, where such decisions would influence the practical impact of laws or 
regulations made by the devolved parliaments, are likely to remain thorny issues.  
In effect, by effectively centralising a large part of de facto power over key 
aspects of future economic, environmental and social policy through this internal 
market approach, the Scottish Government and the other devolved nations would have 
no ability to prevent UK Government agreed international rules and standards in 
devolved areas of competence.  
On the one hand, the UK Government’s approach here – including the drafting 
of the internal market bill – simply conforms to the interpretation that the UK is a 
unitary state. But as is well known, British constitutional law is made up of both hard 
rules and constitutional conventions and the latter cannot be easily ignored. One of the 
most important is the Sewel Convention, which states that the UK Parliament will not 
“normally” legislate in areas that have implications for devolved competencies without 
the consent of devolved legislatures. However, the Sewel Convention is not legally 
binding. It was put into law in the Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017. But 
although these recognise the convention, they do not legally constrain the power of the 
UK Parliament. In 2017, the UK Supreme Court ruled that since Sewel remains a 
political convention, “policing the scope and manner of its operation does not lie within 
the constitutional remit of the judiciary”46. This means the devolved governments 
cannot turn to the courts to enforce the legislative consent convention.  
On the other hand, there is a tension between any view of the UK parliament as 
sovereign and the alternative view of the UK as a plurinational union of nations, with a 
clear respect for devolved vs. reserved policy outcomes47. In effect, the draft 2020 
United Kingdom Internal Market Bill would give UK Ministers powers to regulate a 
potentially wide range of otherwise devolved matters in the name of the internal market, 
a concept which the UK Government itself will define, elaborate, and implement via 
statutory instruments rather than primary legislation. This has created all manner of 
tensions, which have been at their greatest in the case of Scotland. The Scottish 
Government has argued that it should have a formal role in all stages of the development 
of trade agreements, including the formulation of negotiating mandates and treaty 
ratification48. There are two broad sets of reasons put forward by the Scottish 
Government justifying this. First, trade agreements could have potentially different 
implications across economic sectors49. Second, UK trade agreements could constrain 
policymaking in areas that are ostensibly devolved, including the environment, 
agriculture, food standards, housing, and public procurement.  
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On the one hand, Scotland is likely to have different priorities for trade than 
those of the UK as a whole. Scotland’s goods exports are dominated by two sectors: 
“Refined Petroleum” products associated with oil and gas production in the North Sea 
(around 80% of which is from Scottish territorial waters50), and “Food and Drink” (in 
particular whisky). These sectors are relatively less important for the UK. Similarly, 
Scotland has a large agricultural sector, and the Scottish Government has expressed 
concerns about trade agreements with countries that have large and highly productive 
farm sectors. Certain aspects of the fishing industry are also relatively more important 
to the Scottish economy – with landings by Scottish vessels accounting for around 65% 
of the tonnage of all landings by UK vessels in 201851. Although the UK Government 
has promised to protect Scotland’s interests, it is hard to see how it is feasible to protect 
the interests of all regions simultaneously when each have different priorities.  
The Scottish Government has also expressed concern about the potential for the 
UK to pivot away from the EU’s regulatory framework on issues relating to social, 
environmental, and ethical concerns. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has indicated that 
he would be content for UK standards to diverge as part of future trade agreements52. 
In contrast, the Scottish Government’s preference is to maintain alignment with the 
EU53. This is particularly the case in relation to areas of devolved competence such as 
the environment, food standards and animal welfare, but extends to regulatory 
alignment with the EU more broadly54. This objective is justified explicitly by reference 
to a desire to retain what are characterised as more “robust” forms of protection offered 
by the EU relative to (for example) the US. But implicitly, this objective is also shaped 
by the SNP Government’s aspiration for Scotland to be readmitted to the EU as an 
independent member country at some future date55.  
In short, trade agreements have the potential to shape opportunities and 
economic structures in powerful ways, with respect to both devolved and reserved areas 
of policy competence. The Scottish Government summarised these issues thus56: 
The conduct and content of future trade policy, negotiations and agreements will therefore have 
very important implications for Scotland, and it is vital that the Scottish Government is fully 
involved in the process for determining them…the Scottish Government and Scottish 
Parliament must play a much enhanced role in the development of future trade policy and the 
preparation, negotiation, agreement, ratification and implementation of future trade deals, to 
help industries, protect devolved public services and ensure the highest standards of 
environmental and consumer protection in Scotland and across the UK. 
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Of course, one important point here is the question over how much influence the 
Scottish Government had over EU trade policy in the first place. Scotland used to elect 
just six Members of the European Parliament each term, out of 736. Where influence 
was perhaps greater was outside of Parliament through initiatives such as the European 
Committee of Regions), with consulatation from the UK Government on EU policy 
structured through the Joint Ministerial Committee (Europe).  
There is an argument that the Scottish Government is elevating the risks around trade 
to leverage general antipathy and secure electoral gain. The ambitions of the Scottish 
Government to have “full, early and formal involvement in policy formulation and 
opportunities to influence the development and agreement of international 
negotiations” would certainly require a radical transformation of the mechanics of 
intergovernmental relations in the UK. Hence it is not surprising that the Scottish 
Government has frequently pointed to the involvement of Canadian provinces in 
relation to CETA as an example of the positive role that subnational actors can play – 
even if this plays down the fact that the CETA experience was by no means typical of 
provincial involvement in the development of Canadian trade agreements.  
The UK Government responded to the Scottish Government’s proposals with a 
Command Paper outlining the “processes” for making trade deals57. The Command 
Paper contains little by way of specifics, and although it states the UK Government’s 
intention to work “collaboratively” with the devolved administrations, it is envisaged 
that this collaboration will be carried out “within the context of the current 
constitutional make-up of the UK.” As part of this Command Paper, the UK 
Government committed to establish a new “Intergovernmental Forum for Trade.” This 
has met twice in 2020, although terms of reference have yet to be agreed. As set out in 
a letter from the then Minister of State for Trade Policy to the Scottish Parliament’s 
Finance and Constitution Committee58, the UK Government hopes that these 
institutional structures will provide some form of platform for the Scottish Government 
to seek to influence UK-wide trade policies.  
As with any institutional structure, informal relationships will determine how 
successful these new mechanisms are. The Scottish Government has expressed concern 
that they serve as an opportunity for the UK Government to share only limited 
information, without offering opportunity for influence, as was the experience of the 
Joint Ministerial Committee on European Negotiations. Michael Russell, the Scottish 
Government’s Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, Europe and External Affairs has 
described the process as one where the “the devolved Governments are, once again, 
being managed, not engaged.59” The Scottish Government was indeed given no material 
influence over the substance or outcomes of UK-EU negotiations over the terms of 
Brexit. More recently, the Scottish Government was given no meaningful opportunity 
to comment on the UK’s negotiating mandate for EU talks, published in early 2020, nor 
was it given an opportunity to comment on the UK’s negotiating mandates for talks 
with the US and Japan, both of which began in spring 2020. Furthermore, both the EU 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 – which transfers EU legislation onto the UK statute – and the 
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EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 – which passes into law the exit deal negotiated 
with the EU, were passed by the UK Parliament despite the decision of the Scottish 
Parliament to withhold its consent for this legislation.  
The publication of the proposals for the internal market, again without 
consultation, has only heightened these tensions. The UK Government appears to be 
adopting an increasingly top-down and centralising approach. If it seemed unlikely, 
before the UK elections of December 2019, that the Scottish Government and other 
devolved institutions would be granted a meaningful role in the UK’s future trade 
negotiations, it seems even less likely now. This has created further tensions, not helped 
by an apparent breakdown in working relationships between the two governments60. It 
seems likely therefore that the Scottish Government’s ambitions – and those of the other 
devolved governments in Wales and Northern Ireland – to exert greater formal 
influence over future UK trade deals will be thwarted. In such a world, what scope is 
there for these substate governments to exert authority over future trade outcomes? This 
is where we finally turn. 
Subnational trade & investment promotion organizations 
At the upstream of issues related to subnational prerogatives in trade policy 
indeed lies the overlooked variable of trade and investment promotion. Given that in 
both countries, trade and investment promotion is a shared jurisdiction between central 
and subnational levels of government, all major Canadian provinces and British 
devolved regions have been expanding their own commercial paradiplomacy networks, 
which also promote their interests in industrial areas otherwise reserved to central 
governments, such as aerospace in Quebec, or energy in Scotland. Both the UK and 
Canada are indeed home to numerous and influential subnational trade and investment 
promotion organizations (TIPOs), which generally take one of three forms: foreign 
investment promotion agencies, export promotion organizations, or a combination of 
both61.  
In Canada, Quebec’s commercial paradiplomacy network is the most developed, 
with a wide-ranging grid of international offices housing commercial attachés from the 
Ministère de l’Économie and its export promotion unit Export Quebec (EQ), as well as 
business development representatives from the public agency Investissement Quebec 
(IQ), specialized in the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). Scotland’s 
network is also particularly well-developed, with international offices housing 
investment prospectors from Scottish Development International (SDI), a joint-venture 
between the Scottish Government and economic development agencies Scottish 
Enterprise (SE) and Highlands & Islands Enterprise (HIE). The promotion of foreign 
investment and exports is also performed by GlobalScot, a networking service 
mobilizing the Scottish business diaspora to assist Scotland’s exporters and inward 
investors62. 
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Table 3. Major TIPOs in Canada/Quebec and the UK/Scotland 
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The trade and investment networks of Scotland and Quebec, besides, have already 
proved their importance and effectiveness. The Scottish network coordinates closely 
with the Scottish Government and with other business organizations such as chambers 
of commerce, exporters associations, sectoral industrial associations, and British trade 
and diplomacy services. Since 2008, FDI projects attracted by SDI generated tens of 
thousands of “high value-added” jobs in Scotland and helped many thousands of 
exporters break into new markets63. This makes SDI one of Europe’s best performing 
TIPOs, both in terms of attracted FDI per capita and in terms of aftercare and 
networking services offered to foreign investors64. The Scottish network’s support for 
exporters (information, managerial training, and financial aid) is also widely 
recognized, including by the Scottish business community65. 
The activities of Scottish TIPOs have lately been intensified, with a renewed 
focus on first-time exporters and investors, strategic industrial sectors, and new target 
markets, in line with the Scottish Government’s latest trade and investment strategies66. 
New centres have been opened in Dublin, Berlin, and Beijing in recent years. Canada 
is also one of those new target markets, following the 2010 “Plan for Engagement with 
Canada” and the 2017 “Canada Engagement Strategy.” The establishment of new staff 
at the Toronto and Calgary offices, the strengthening of the GlobalScot network in 
Canada, and the creation of the Alberta-Scottish Business Association and British 
Columbia-Scottish Business Association have tightened Scotland’s trade and 
investment relationships with Canada67. The input of Scotland’s TIPOs in the context 
of potential international trade negotiations after Brexit, including but not restricted to 
talks between Canada and the UK, would thus be highly valuable. 
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 The same can be said of Quebec’s network, which also coordinate with 
Canadian services and with other Quebec organizations such as the Organismes 
régionaux de promotion des exportations, Montréal International, and Québec 
International. From 2009 to 2019, IQ attracted close to 800 FDI projects worth over 
$CAD 17 billion. Among the industrial sectors targeted by IQ are aerospace and 
transport, information and communication technologies, software, life sciences, 
renewable energy, and food & drink68. In the case of export promotion, outward FDI, 
and overseas expansions, the work of EQ and the Ministry of the Economy has, between 
2007 and 2019, led to expenditures of $CAD 180 million in financial aid to exporters, 
the accompaniment of over 37,000 businesses overseas, and participation in over 940 
commercial missions69. There is no overstating, therefore, the potential input Quebec’s 
TIPOs could provide in future trade talks, in support of both substate and central 
governments.   
As part of a new international strategy devised by the Quebec government, 
besides, IQ and EQ will soon be merged and operate as an integrated, trade and 
investment promotion agency70. Such a streamlining of export promotion and 
investment prospection is in line with emerging policy practices across developed 
economies, as governments aim to offer rationalised support to foreign businesses 
focused on re-exportation, and to domestic firms looking to export, invest, or expand 
abroad. For all these reasons, Quebec’s TIPOs’ knowledge of exporters’ and investors’ 
needs could become of great value for negotiators in future trade talks. Yet, in previous 
trade negotiations, including those in which, such as in the case of CETA, Canadian 
provinces were deeply involved from the onset, the input of provincial TIPOs has been 
minimal. 
In 2017, a large-scale survey of TIPOs from OECD countries established that 
although policy advocacy and coordination with government officials, diplomatic 
teams, and private-sector trade or business associations are very common practices 
(Table 3), few TIPOs actually engage in trade facilitation (25%) or in the negotiation 
of international trade agreements themselves (10%)71. Even though, therefore, 
coordination between national governments or TIPOs and subnational TIPOs are also 
common practice, allowing for the integration of regional/local trade and investment 
needs into national strategies, or for the conduct of “joint” promotion activities72, 
subnational TIPOs have not yet been directly involved in trade negotiation processes. 
Three main factors can explain this gap between TIPOs’ input potential, and their 
exclusion from these processes: the highly political nature of such negotiations, the 
exclusive jurisdiction of central governments over international trade, and the difficulty 
of translating TIPOs’ “microeconomic” knowledge of businesses’ needs into practical, 
“macro-level” treaty provisions73.  
Table 2. Share of OECD TIPOs performing policy advocacy activities74  
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Given the increasingly complex nature of “new generation” trade agreements, however, 
and given the instabilities affecting the international economic climate in recent years, 
this may be starting to change. One interesting example of that was the close 
engagement of Quebec and Scottish governments with their respective TIPOs and trade 
offices in the UK and Canada following the 2016 Brexit vote. Given the uncertainties 
raised by this vote with regards to investors’ and businesses’ reciprocal access to British 
and Canadian markets, regular conference calls and meetings between TIPOs, their 
overseas offices, and government officials were held since late 2016 for the purpose of 
information-sharing on market conditions and on potential shifts in tariffs or 
regulations. Similarly, regular consultations with trade promotion offices and TIPOs 
were organized by Quebec and Scottish government officials to gather information on 
businesses’ and investors’ worries and needs, information which could be used in future 
bilateral trade talks between Canada and post-Brexit UK75.   
The current contribution of Quebec and Scottish TIPOs therefore mainly 
consists, for now, in maximizing and diversifying trade and investment flows while 
keeping their subnational (and to a lesser extent, national) government sponsors up-to-
date on market conditions and on businesses’ or investors’ needs. It is a contribution, 
in other words, focused on outcomes. Yet, this knowledge also represents a great, 
untapped potential for well-informed, multi-level trade policymaking and negotiations 
in the future. One way to utilize this potential might be to develop, as Sweden or France 
have done76, formal networks, frameworks, and processes of information-sharing and 
collaboration between Canadian and British subnational and national TIPOs. While 
circumventing the formal division of powers between levels of government, this would 
allow for the inclusion of subnational organizations in nation-wide international trade 
and investment apparatuses, and it would facilitate the concatenation of market 
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information towards policy inputs that are shared or at least, commonly presented and 
thereby more useful to central government negotiators.     
Conclusion 
Our review of the experience of both Canada and the UK provide a number of 
useful conclusions for policymakers and scholars seeking to gain insights about the 
potential role of substate regions in influencing trade negotiations. While the experience 
of Canadian provinces, and especially of Quebec, in the negotiation of trade deals is 
interesting for the UK context, the extent to which the Canadian model can be applied 
to the UK is debatable. Canada is a federal state, with a constitution that allows for 
strong provincial influence on a wide range of policy matters. The UK, in contrast, is a 
unitary state with devolved administrations, where only the UK Parliament is sovereign. 
Intergovernmental conflicts that have arisen since the Brexit vote have emphasized the 
fundamental tensions that arise where the UK and devolved governments disagree over 
fields of competence.  
Whilst the UK government has recently re-affirmed its commitment to the 
Sewel Convention, which states that the UK government will not normally legislate in 
areas of devolved competence, this in no way grants any kind of veto to Scotland or 
other devolved administrations over the implementation of international agreements. In 
the wake of Brexit, the UK government recognised the need for a more inclusive 
approach to developing future trade policy, but the extent to which it is genuinely 
committed to enabling devolved parliaments and legislatures to influence, as opposed 
to simply be informed about, the development of trade agreements remains uncertain. 
Although the ongoing tensions between the Scottish and UK governments thus make 
progress on such reforms very challenging in the short-term, there is still an urgent need 
for improvement if further constitutional and political crises are to be avoided as the 
UK multiplies post-Brexit trade negotiations.  
This is where the Canadian experience becomes instructive, although far from 
perfect or devoid from conflicts. This would be particularly true if Canada and the UK 
were to enter into formal, bilateral trade negotiations in the wake of Brexit. In the event, 
provinces and devolved regions could agree on a set of common demands regarding 
their involvement in negotiations themselves, and with regards to issues of provincial 
or devolved responsibility. Short of such a concerted approach, however, substate 
governments will continue to look for other ways to influence trade outcomes. 
Provincial and regional TIPOs might therefore be consulted more systematically and, 
short of being included in the elaboration of trade policies and negotiation mandates 
themselves, will likely intensify their activities in order to ensure that provincial and 
regional industries, exporters, and investors can avoid being harmed by nationally-
devised policies and treaties, while enjoying continued support to target and access their 
own preferred markets. 
